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embodiment in a living individual or material organism.'' The term is presented in dictionaries of the occult: the Encyclopedia of Ghosts and Spirits (Guilei 1992) , for example, defines it as ''the system of beliefs about souls and spirits typically found in tribal societies,'' and the Dictionary of Mysticism and the Occult (Drury 1985) defines it as ''the belief, common among many pre-literate societies, that trees, mountains, rivers and other natural formations possess an animating power or spirit.'' Amazingly, the century-old Tylorian concept appears in all these diverse sources (popular and academic, general and specific) revised little if at all. Animism, a 19th-century representation of an ethnographically researchable practice particularly conspicuous among indigenous peoples but by no means limited to them, is depicted by them all as an ''object'' in-the-world. The 1. I am indebted to Ingrid Jordt for her penetrating insights and survival of the Tylorian representation is enigmatic becommentary. I thank Tim Ingold for instructive comments, some of which will await follow-up work. I acknowledge with pleasure comments on earlier drafts generously offered by Kalman Appl-2. Primitive culture led Tylor to an appointment as Reader in Anthropology in Oxford University, the first such position in the acabaum, Debbi Bernstein, Eva Illouz, Steve Kaplan, Yoram Carmeli, Nira Reiss, and Zvi Sobel.
demic world (Preus 1987:131) .
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S68 c ur ren t an thr o po lo g y Volume 40, Supplement, February 1999 cause the logic underlying it is today questionable. Ty-digenous identities and, in partial ways, of parts of Western identities, too.) The argument will develop lor was not as rigid a positivist as he is often made out to be (see Ingold 1986:94-96; Leopold 1980) . However, through three subsequent sections to its twofold conclusion: a fresh visit to the animism concept and to the he developed this representation within a positivistic spiritual/materialist dichotomy of 19th-century design indigenous phenomena themselves. It will posit a plurality of epistemologies by refiguring so-called primiin direct opposition to materialist science, in the belief (and as part of an effort to prove this belief) that only tive animism as a relational epistemology. The perspective to be employed is presented not as more valid than science yielded ''true'' knowledge of the world. Furthermore, the moral implications of this representation are any other but as one now needed in studies of the complex phenomena which Tylor denoted as ''animism.'' unacceptable now. Tylor posited that ''animists'' understood the world childishly and erroneously, and under
The first part offers a critical perspective on the ''textual conversation'' (to use Gudeman and Rivera's [1990] the influence of 19th-century evolutionism he read into this cognitive underdevelopment. Yet the concept still term) relevant to animism to date, singling out for close attention the theories of Tylor (1958 Tylor ( [1871 ), Durkheim pervasively persists.
Equally surprisingly, the ethnographic referent-the (1960[1914], 1915) , Lé vi-Strauss (1962 , 1966 [1962 ), and Guthrie (1993) . It is argued that positivistic ideas about researchable cultural practices which Tylor denoted by the signifier/signified of ''animism''-has remained a the meaning of ''nature,'' ''life,'' and ''personhood'' misdirected these previous attempts to understand the lopuzzle 3 despite the great interest which the subject has attracted. Ethnographers continue to cast fresh ethno-cal concepts. Classical theoreticians (it is argued) attributed their own modernist ideas of self to ''primitive graphic material far richer than Tylor had (or could have imagined possible) into one or more of the Tylorian cat-peoples'' while asserting that the ''primitive peoples '' read their idea of self into others! This led the theoretiegories ''religion,'' ''spirits, '' and ''supernatural beings'' (e.g., Endicott 1979 , Howell 1984 , Morris 1981 , Bird-cians to prejudge the attribution of ''personhood'' to natural objects as empirically unfounded and conse- David 1990 , Gardner 1991 , Feit 1994 , Povinelli 1993 , Riches 1994 . At the same time, they have commonly quently to direct analytical effort to explaining why people did it and why and how (against all appearances) avoided the issue of animism and even the term itself rather than revisit this prevalent notion in light of their their ''belief'' was not a part of their practical knowledge but at best a part of their symbolic representations new and rich ethnographies. 4 A twofold vicious cycle has ensued. The more the or a mistaken strategic guess.
The second part of the paper offers an ethnographic term is used in its old Tylorian sense, without benefit of critical revision, the more Tylor's historically situated analysis of the phenomenon which Tylor termed ''animism'' largely drawn from my work with hunter-gathperspective is taken as ''real,'' as the phenomenon which it only glosses, and as a ''symbol that stands for erer Nayaka in South India. 5 A case is developed through the ethnographic material, starting from Halloitself'' (Wagner 1981). In turn, anthropology's success in universalizing the use of the term itself reinforces de-well's remarkable 1960 ''Ojibwa Ontology, Behavior, and World View'' and circumventing the ''spirit/body'' rogatory images of indigenous people whose rehabilitation from them is one of its popular roles.
and ''natural/supernatural'' modernist dichotomies that have often landed other ethnographers in ''spirit,'' This paper attempts a solution generally drawing on a synthesis of current environment theory (insisting ''supernatural,'' and ''religion'' descriptions. Nayaka devaru (superpersons) are tackled as a concept and a phethat the environment does not necessarily consist dichotomously of a physical world and humans) and cur-nomenon, both composite and complex, in a threefold manner. First, using Strathern's (1988) notion of the ''dirent personhood theory (asserting that personhood does not necessarily consist dualistically of body and spirit). vidual'' (a person constitutive of relationships), after Marriott's (1976) ''dividual'' (a person constitutive of These dualistic conceptions are historical constructs of a specific culture which, for want of a better term, will transferable particles that form his or her personal substance), I argue that devaru are dividual persons. They henceforth be referred to by the circumlocution ''modernist.'' (''Modernist'' signals neither the dichotomous are constitutive of sharing relationships reproduced by Nayaka with aspects of their environment. The devaru opposite of ''primitive'' nor the equivalent of ''scientific'' but ideas and practices that dominated the Euro-are objectifications of these relationships and make them known. Second, drawing on Gibson (1979) and InAmerican cultural landscape from the 17th to the 20th century. Furthermore, ''modernist self-concepts'' will gold (1992) , I posit that in another sense devaru are a constitutive part of Nayaka's environment, born of the be used as an objectification of what is often only a fragment of peoples' composite identity, a part of their con-''affordances'' of events in-the-world. Nayaka's ''attention'' ecologically perceives mutually responsive sciousness, while ''local person-concepts'' will be used as an objectification of fragments of today's complex in-5. Fieldwork was conducted in 1978-79 and was followed by a revisit in 1989. Research was supported by a Smutz Visiting Fellow-3. It is regarded ''one of the oldest anthropological puzzles'' by Descola (1996:82) .
ship, an Anthony Wilkin Studentship, an H. M. Chadwick Studentship, and funds from the Jerusalem Foundation for Anthropological 4. An exception coming close to revisiting the notion is Hallowell (1960) ; a liminal exception is Guthrie's recent revisit (1993) , Des-Studies and the Horovitz Institute for Research of Developing Countries. For ethnographic background see Bird-David (1989 , cola (1992 , 1996 contrasts ''totemic systems'' and ''animic systems'' but does not look deeply into animism as such.
1996).
changes in things in-the-world and at the same time in of a particular modern sect '' (1958 [1871] :10). Under the probable influence of his knowledge of modern spirituthemselves. These relatednesses are devaru in-theworld, met by Nayaka as they act in, rather than think alism, Tylor argued that in the savage view every man had, in addition to his body, a ''ghost-soul,'' a ''thin unabout, the world. Lastly, I argue that devaru performances-in which performers in trance ''bring to life'' substantial human image,'' the ''cause of life or thought in the individual it animates,'' capable ''of leaving the devaru characters, with whom the participants socialize (talking, joking, arguing, singing, sharing or just de-body far behind'' and ''continuing to exist and appear to men after the death of that body'' (quoted in Stocking mand-sharing, and asking for advice and help)-are social experiences which are nested within (not di-1987:192) . Being ''a confirmed scientific rationalist' ' (p. 191) , Tylor suggested that this view was a delusion, in chotomized from) social-economic practice. These performances are pivotal in both ''educating the attention'' the same way that he regarded the spiritual sé ances of his time as a delusion. to devaru in-the-world (Gibson 1979) and reproducing devaru as dividual persons.
Tylor's work was probably also influenced by observations of children (see Stocking 1971:90) . He argued The third part of the paper theorizes animism as animisms, arguing that hunter-gatherer animism consti-that the ''savages'' were doubly mistaken, believing in their own ''ghost-souls'' but like children attributing tutes a relational (not a failed) epistemology. This epistemology is about knowing the world by focusing the same to things around them. Durkheim (1915:53) neatly made the point as follows: primarily on relatednesses, from a related point of view, within the shifting horizons of the related viewer. The knowing grows from and is the knower's skills of mainFor Tylor, this extension of animism was due to the particular mentality of the primitive, who, like an taining relatedness with the known. This epistemology is regarded by Nayaka (and probably other indigenous infant, cannot distinguish the animate and the inanimate. Since the first beings of which the child compeoples we call hunter-gatherers) as authoritative against other ways of knowing the world. It functions mences to have an idea are men, that is, himself and those around him, it is upon this model of huin other contexts (including Western) with, against, and sometimes despite other local authoritative epistemolman nature that he tends to think of everything. . . . Now the primitive thinks like a child. Consequently, ogies. Diversifying along with person-concepts and environmental praxis, animisms are engendered neither he also is inclined to endow all things, even inanimate ones, with a nature analogous to his own. by confusion nor by wrong guesses but by the employment of human socially biased cognitive skills.
Tylor's view conformed with the contemporaneous identification of early people with the child state of society (animating society!) and with the identification of Animism in the Modernist Mirror contemporaneous ''primitives'' with early people and so with the child state too. However, while arguing that in Sir Edward Burnett Tylor (1831 Tylor ( -1917 , the founding father of anthropology, took his notion of animism from thinking like a child the primitive ''endow[s] all things, even inanimate ones, with a nature analogous to his the 17th-century alchemist Stahl, who had himself revived the term from classical theory (Tylor 1958 (Tylor [1871 : own,'' Tylor read into the primitive view the modernist spiritualist understanding of ''one's own nature,'' not 9). Drawing on secondhand accounts of ''primitive'' peoples (to use the period's term), Tylor observed that the primitive's or the child's sense of ''his own nature.'' At issue at the time was how religion had evolved and many of them attributed life and personality to animal, vegetable, and mineral alike. He developed a theory of how it ought to be related to science. This evolutionary question engaged Tylor, who suggested that modern rethis phenomenon in a series of papers written between 1866 and 1870 that culminated in Primitive Culture. ligion had evolved in stages from animistic beliefs. By them early peoples had tried to explain the world to Tylor offered a situated perspective, limited by the time's ethnography and theory, and it should be studied themselves, and these beliefs had ''survived'' into the present and (re)appeared universally among children in its context.
As he developed his theory of animism, Tylor took an and ''primitive'' people and in certain modern cults. In Tylor's view, as one of his commentators put it, ''it was interest in the modern spiritualist movement, fashionable at the time. He even went to London from Somer-as though primitive man, in an attempt to create science, had accidentally created religion instead, and set for a month to investigate spiritualist sé ances (Stocking 1971) . In 1869 he argued that ''modern spiri-mankind had spent the rest of evolutionary time trying to rectify the error'' (Stocking 1987:192) . tualism is a survival and a revival of savage thought '' (quoted in Stocking 1971:90) . This argument probably In Tylor's view, animism and science (in a ''longwaged contest '' [1886] , quoted by Stocking 1987:192) influenced his view of ''savage thought,'' which he had acquired only from reading. In an odd reversal, he con-were fundamentally antithetical. Consequently, animistic beliefs featured as ''wrong'' ideas according to structed the origin of ''savage thought'' from his firsthand knowledge of what he presumed was its rem-Tylor, who clinched the case by explaining in evolutionary terms (as was the custom at the time) how the nant-modern spiritualism. He even considered using the term ''spiritualism'' rather than ''animism'' but de-primitive came to have this spiritualist sense of his ''own nature.'' Tylor suggested that dreams of dead relacided against it because it had ''become the designation tives and of the primitive himself in distant places had Claude Lé vi-Strauss addressed the anthropological category ''totemism,'' which encompasses aspects of led him to form this self idea. The thesis projected the primitive as delirious as well as perceiving the world the phenomenon which Tylor termed ''animism.'' His work provided the first modern explanation that aclike a child.
Tylor's theory has had deep and lasting influence on cepted indigenous knowledge of the world. However, the explanation rested on dissociating that knowledge anthropological theory. It was pivotal in its time, and subsequent theories developed in dialectical relations from totemic notions, reducing the latter to symbolic representations. Lé vi-Strauss did not question the auwith it in turn became themselves influential theories in dialectical relations with which further theories were thority of the Western objectivist view of reality, which accepted a priori the nature/society dualism. To rehaformulated. I point to one critical theoretical trend pertinent to my study by means of several examples (se-bilitate the Durkheimian primitives he argued that indigenous peoples perceived the world in this way, too. lected for temporal diversity, not necessarily centrality in the field) from classic theories to recent ones. My ex-They perceived the discontinuity between nature and society and viewed nature itself as a world of discrete amples chronologically advance from Emile Durkheim's work on religion (1960 [1914] , 1915) through objects; then they used nature as ''something good to think with'' about societal divisions. They drew analoClaude Lé vi-Strauss's work on totemism and the ''savage mind '' (1962, 1966 [1962] ) to a recent work on an-gies between things in nature and groups in society (1962) . They concerned themselves with the same repthropomorphism by Stewart Guthrie (1993) .
Durkheim rescued the primitive from the Tylorian resentations of things in the world as Westerners did, but their ''totemic thought'' fancifully intermingled image of a delirious human, but in doing so he embroiled himself further in the modernist self model(s). these representations with mystical tales, like the bricoleur, whereas our ''scientific thought'' logically In an article significantly entitled ''The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions' ' (1960 [1914] ), he sorted them out, like the engineer (1966 [1962] ). The indigenous accounts of kinship relationships with natural argued that the primitive self model is ''not a vain mythological concept that is without foundations in re-entities, Lé vi-Strauss argued, only evinced the analogical and totemic nature of their thought-neither an erality'' (p. 329)-that ''in every age'' man had had a dualistic model originating from a basic and universal social roneous epistemology nor an adequate alternative to our own. He criticized earlier theory for placing indigeexperience, the simultaneous sense of bodily sensations and being part of society. The primitive self model, in nous peoples on the ''nature'' side of the dualistic nature/culture split. However, while he correctively his view, was a specific case of this (modernist) universal model. He argued that the primitive makes abstract placed them on the ''culture'' side, he placed the dualistic split itself inside their ''savage mind '' (1966 [1962] ). society tangible to himself by a totem and so views his own self as dualistically consisting of body/totemic He did not explain animism but explained it away. Animists by his theory did not perceive the natural world parts (rather than body/mind in the modernist view). Durkheim restored credence in the primitive self model differently from others.
A recent attempt at a solution to the century-old but remained critical, along with Tylor, of its attribution to other than human entities. He still cast this at-problem why people animate what we regard as inanimate objects is that of Stewart Guthrie (1993), who detribution (again, with Tylor) as the erroneous mental operation of a child.
fines animating things in these words: ''Scanning the world for what most concerns us-living things and esDurkheim also read his own modernist (biologistic) kinship into accounts suggesting that ''primitive peo-pecially humans-we find many apparent cases. Some of these prove illusory. When they do, we are animating ples'' regarded as kin and friends some entities that were animated by them. Drawing on richer ethno-(attributing life to the nonliving) or anthropomorphizing (attributing human characteristics to the nonhugraphic sources than Tylor's, he noted that ''primitives'' believed that the bonds between them and these natural man) '' (1993:62) . The expression ''attributing life to the nonliving'' at a stroke relegates animistic beliefs to the entities were ''like those which unite the members of a single family '' (1915:139) : bonds of friendship, interde-category of ''mistake,'' regressing from the earlier advance made by Lé vi-Strauss. Guthrie regards modernist pendence, and shared characteristics and fortunes (pp. 158-60).
6 To explain this, he argued that they mistook meanings of such notions as ''life,'' ''nonliving,'' and ''human'' as naturally given.
7 the spiritual unity of the totemic force, which ''really'' existed, for a bodily unity of flesh, which did not. He Guthrie reduces what Tylor offered as a universal cultural category (Preus 1987) to a universal biological one. himself obviously mistook their kinship for his modernist construction of it as shared biological matter He views animistic thinking as a natural ''perceptual strategy'' for the survival of any animal (pp. 38, 41, 47, (flesh, blood, DNA, or whatever other finer biological connection will be discovered by scientists [Schneider 54, 61): 1968 [Schneider 54, 61): , 1984 ).
7. Guthrie perceptively discusses the boundaries ''life''/''nonliving'' and ''human''/''animal'' as they are diversely drawn across 6. Durkheim distinguished between natural entities, or ''individual totems,'' regarded as friends and kin, and ''group totems, '' the arti-cultures (e.g., 1993: 86-89, 112-13) , but he makes this observation in support of his argument that it is difficult to differentiate befactual representations of natural entities, worshipped in celebrations. tween these entities.
We not infrequently are in doubt as to whether 1930s) and especially his paper ''Ojibwa Ontology, Behavior, and World View'' (1960) are provocative starting something is alive. When we are in doubt, the best strategy is to assume that it is . . . risking over-inter-points for our reassessment of theories of animism. Hallowell observed that the Ojibwa sense of personhood, pretation by betting on the most significant possibility . . . because if we are wrong we lose little and if which they attribute to some natural entities, animals, winds, stones, etc., is fundamentally different from the we are right we gain much. . . . Animism, then, results from a simple form of game theory employed modernist one. The latter takes the axiomatic split between ''human'' and ''nonhuman'' as essential, with by animals ranging at least from frogs to people. . . .
[it] is an inevitable result of normal perceptual un-''person'' being a subcategory of ''human.'' The Ojibwa conceives of ''person'' as an overarching category certainty and of good perceptual strategy. . . . The mistake embodied in animism-a mistake we can within which ''human person,'' ''animal person,'' ''wind person,'' etc., are subcategories. Echoing Evansdiscover only after the fact-is the price of our need to discover living organisms. It is a cost occasionPritchard's account of Azande magic (1937), Hallowell furthermore argues that, contrary to received wisdom ally incurred by any animal that perceives.
and in the absence of objectivist dogma, experience itThis cognitive evolutionist explanation of animism self does not rule out Ojibwa animistic ideas. On the seems ingeniously simple. Assuming, with Tylor, that contrary, he argues (a point reiterated by later ethnograanimistic interpretations are erroneous, Guthrie argues phers [see Scott 1989 , Feit 1994 ), experience is consisthat the making of animistic interpretations itself is tent with their reading of things, given an animistic part of ''a good perceptual strategy.'' Animistic interpre-dogma. tations are ''reasonable'' errors that ''we can discover
Hallowell's contribution is to free the study of anionly after the fact.'' mistic beliefs and practices first from modernist personBut Guthrie's thesis is weak in its own terms. 8 We concepts and second from the presumption that these lapse into animistic expressions under uncertainty, but notions and practices are erroneous. However, the case we use such expressions more, and more consistently, needs to be further pursued. He states that the Ojibwa when we regularly and closely engage with things we sense of personhood is different without exploring its are not doubtful about: plants we grow, cars we love, sense far enough, perhaps because, although the concomputers we use. (Guthrie himself mentions these ex-cept goes back to Marcel Mauss's work of 1938, 9 before amples.) Even professional ethologists, who are trained the 1960s research into the ''person'' as a cross-cultural to regard their study animals as objects, regard them as category hardly existed. He argues that Ojibwa engagepersons the more they interact with them (see Kennedy ment in the world does not rebuff their animistic views 1992:27). The theory in any case does not resolve the but does not explain how the beliefs are engendered and classic enigma of so-called primitive people's mainte-perpetuated. I shall pursue his insight through ethnonance of animistic beliefs. At best, the question re-graphic material largely drawn from my work with mains why (if they retrospectively recognize their ani-Nayaka, a hunter-gatherer community of the forested mistic interpretations as mistakes) they culturally Gir Valley in the Nilgiri region of South India.
10 My obendorse and elaborate these ''mistakes.'' At worst, the jective will be to understand the senses of what they theory further downgrades indigenous cognitive ability, call devaru, a concept which is not just a foreign word for now they cannot do even what frogs can do, namely, requiring translation but enigmatic to positivistic ''after the fact'' recognize their ''mistakes.'' In this case, thought. Neither ''spirits'' (deriving from the spirit/ the theory even regresses from the advances made by body dualism of the modernist person-concept) nor ''suTylor.
pernatural beings'' (mirroring the Western idea of nature) 11 is an appropriate English equivalent, though these are the common translations of corresponding noLocal Senses of Devaru tions in other studies. 12 Hallowell's alternative ''otherthan-human persons'' escapes these biased notions but Personhood concepts and ecological perception are two still conserves the primary objectivist concern with fruitful areas from which to reevaluate our theories of classes (human and other-than-human). I use ''superperanimist practices and beliefs. Irving Hallowell's ethnog-sons'' (persons with extra powers) as a general reference raphy of the Ojibwa (from fieldwork conducted in the Lake Winnipeg area of northern Canada during the 9. Mauss's work was first translated into English only in 1979 (and see 1985) . For some recent works on the ''self'' see Morris (1994), Carrithers, Collins, and Lukes (1985) , and Shweder and LeVine 8. Guthrie focuses on what he calls ''the West'' because ''animism is usually attributed to simple societies. '' His examples, taken out (1984) .
10. The Gir Valley is a fictive name for one of the Nilgiri-Wynaad's of their contexts, range from French and Spanish cave art through Greek, Roman, and medieval philosophy and the arts to modern valleys.
11. See Durkheim (1915 ), Lovejoy (1948 ), Saler (1977 , Descola science, social science, literature and advertisement, and ''daily life in the contemporary United States.'' His scant references to ''sim-(1996) . 12. See Endicott (1979 ), Howell (1984 , Morris (1981) , Bird-David ple societies'' draw not on the richer new ethnography but on outdated secondary sources such as Thompson (1955) and Ehnmark (1990) , Gardner (1991 ), Feit (1994 , Povinelli (1993) , and, for a comparison, Mageo and Howard (1996). (1939). and let the local composite meanings grow from the terrain would have allowed their dispersal. They contained one, two, or sometimes even three living spaces, context. barely separated from each other, each occupied by a nuclear family. Weather permitting, families rested, devaru as objectifications of sharing ate, and slept in the open beside outdoor fireplaces only relationships a few meters apart. They led their domestic lives together, sharing space, things, and actions. They experiIn her critically oriented comparison of the Melanesian and the Euro-American ''person, '' Strathern (1988) ar-enced simultaneously what happened to them and to their fellow Nayaka. This was the case with respect to gues that the irreducibility of the individual is a peculiarly modernist notion.
13 It is not everywhere that the most Nayaka in the Gir area, not just the residents of one's own place, because there was much movement individual is regarded as ''a single entity,'' ''bounded and integrated, and set contrastingly against other such between sites and people stayed at each other's places for days, weeks, and even months at a time. wholes and against a natural and social backgrounds'' (Clifford Geertz, quoted in Strathern 1988:57). The Mel-
The idea that one shared space, things, and actions with others was central to the Nayaka view of social anesian ''person'' is a composite of relationships, a microcosm homologous to society at large (1988:13, 131) . life. A Nayaka was normatively expected to share with everybody as and when present, especially (but not This person objectifies relationships and makes them known. She calls it a ''dividual,'' in contrast with the only) large game, irrespective of preexisting social ties, criteria, and entitlement. Sharing with anyone present (Euro-American) ''individual. '' 14 This is a notion well known in South Asian scholarship from the work of was as important as if not more important than effecting a distribution of things among people. A Nayaka McKim Marriott and Ronald Inden (Marriott 1976, Marriott and Inden 1977; see Daniel 1984 , Raheja 1988a to give others what they asked for, whatever this might be, to preempt refusals and Barnett 1976 for ethnographic explorations), who agree with Dumont (1966) that ''the Indian is misrepre-and hence challenges to the felt sense that ''all of us here share with each other.'' The idea and practice of sented if depicted as an individual, but less because the person has a holistic-collectivist identity than because, sharing constituted a habitus within which agentive negotiation, manipulation, and nonconformity took place according to Indian ways of thinking and explaining, each person is a composite of transferable particles that (see Bird-David 1990) . For example, normally people shared things requested of them, but when exceptionform his or her personal substance'' (Mines 1994:6).
I derive from Strathern's ''dividual'' (a person consti-ally they did not want to part with something, rather than disrupt the ongoing sense of sharing-the rhythm tutive of relationships) the verb ''to dividuate,'' which is crucial to my analysis. When I individuate a human of everyday social life-they hid that thing or avoided people. This way, they preempted chances of sharing rebeing I am conscious of her ''in herself'' (as a single separate entity); when I dividuate her I am conscious of quests and refusals. Equally, people excessively requested things from people they wanted to embarrass or how she relates with me. This is not to say that I am conscious of the relationship with her ''in itself,'' as a manipulate into persistent giving.
As I understand it, this common experience of sharthing. Rather, I am conscious of the relatedness with my interlocutor as I engage with her, attentive to what ing space, things, and actions contextualized Nayaka's knowledge of each other: they dividuated each other. she does in relation to what I do, to how she talks and listens to me as I talk and listen to her, to what happens They gradually got to know not how each talked but how each talked with fellows, not how each worked but simultaneously and mutually to me, to her, to us. Nayaka, I argue, lived in a social environment which how each worked with fellows, not how each shared but how each shared with fellows, etc. They got to facilitated and was reproduced by dividuating fellow Nayaka.
15 Numbering in 1978-79 fewer than 70 per-know not other Nayaka in themselves but Nayaka as they interrelated with each other, Nayaka-in-relatsons, they occupied five sites at a distance of 2-10 km from each other. The largest was made up of five dwell-edness with fellow Nayaka. Through cumulative experiences, they sensed each other as dividuated personaliings, the others of between one and three. The dwellings (thatched huts with walls made of interwoven ties, each with a relatively persisting way of engaging with others against the relative change involved in their strips of bamboo) stood close to each other, though the mutual engagement. Nayaka speakers, for example, commonly described fellow Nayaka by the way they be- as kin, relatives, ''ones related with.'' In everyday social interaction they normally referred to and addressed them and share with them. Their composite personhood is constitutive of sharing relationships not each other by kinship terms (''my big-uncle,'' ''my brother,'' ''my sister-in-law,'' etc.). Anyone they persis-only with fellow Nayaka but with members of other species in the vicinity. They make their personhood by tently shared with (even a non-Nayaka person like the anthropologist) they regarded as kin. 16 They reckoned producing and reproducing sharing relationships with surrounding beings, humans and others. They do not direlationally which kinship term was appropriate at each moment (for example, calling ''my paternal uncle'' the chotomize other beings vis-à -vis themselves (see BirdDavid 1992a) but regard them, while differentiated, as relative ''my father '' called ''my brother'' [see BirdDavid 1994:591-93] ). They generally referred to people nested within each other. They recognize that the other beings have their different ''affordances'' and are of diwith whom they shared place, things, and actions as sonta (''relatives,'' a term usually used with the prefix verse sorts, which is indicated among other things by the different words by which they refer to them (hills, nama, ''our''), a notion that corresponds with other hunter-gatherer notions such as Pintupi walytja and In-elephants, etc.). However, Nayaka also appreciate that they share the local environment with some of these beuit ila (see Myers 1986 , Guemple 1988 . Their kinship was primarily made and remade by recurring social ac-ings, which overrides these differences and absorbs their sorts into one ''we-ness.'' Beings who are absorbed tions of sharing and relating with, not by blood or by descent, not by biology or by myth or genealogy.
into this ''we-ness'' are devaru, and while differentiated from avaru (people), they and avaru, in some contexts, Transcending idiosyncratic, processual, and multiple flows of meanings, the Nayaka sense of the person ap-are absorbed into one ''we-ness,'' which Nayaka also call nama sonta. The devaru are often objectified by pears generally to engage not the modernist subject/object split or the objectivist concern with substances but kinship terms, especially ette and etta(n) (grandmother and grandfather) and occasionally dodawa and dodappa the above-mentioned sense of kinship. The person is sensed as ''one whom we share with.'' It is sensed as a (''big'' mother and father). The use of kinship terms for superpersons, especially ''grandparents,'' is common relative and is normally objectified as kin, using a kinship term. The phrase nama sonta is used in the gener-also among other hunter-gatherers (e.g., see Hallowell 1960:27) . alizing sense of the proverbial phrase ''we, the people. '' 17 Its use extends beyond the Nayaka group (family, kinMaintaining relationships with fellow Nayaka but also with other local beings is critical to maintaining dred, neighbors) to the aggregate of local people (Nayaka and others) with whom Nayaka closely engage. To re-Nayaka identity because it is critical to maintaining personhood. They retain immediate engagement with turn to Strathern's dividual (a person which objectifies relationships and makes them known), in the Nayaka the natural environment and hold devaru performances even when they make a living by different means such context the dividual objectifies relationships of a certain kind, local kinship relationships which are objecti-as casual labor. This is common among many other hunter-gatherers, even those well integrated into their fications of mutual sharing of space, things, and actions. Analytically referring to these relationships as ''sharing respective states who live by such diverse means as state benefits or jobs in the state bureaucracy (see, e.g., relationships'' (because the term ''kinship relationships'' inevitably invokes associations of biologistic or Tanner 1979 , Povinelli 1993 , Bird-David 1992b . By maintaining relationships with other local beings to rights-and-duties kinship), we can say that the Nayaka dividual objectifies sharing relationships and makes reproduce their personhood, Nayaka reproduce the devaru-ness of the other beings with whom they share. them known. This dividual is emergent, constituted by relationships which in Fred Myers's words ''are not to-The other beings are drawn into interrelating and sharing with Nayaka and so into Nayaka kinship relationtally 'given' [but] must be worked out in a variety of social processes' ' (1986:159) .
ships. These relationships constitute the particular beings as devaru. We cannot say-as Tylor did-that Nayaka ''think with'' this idea of personhood about their environment, To summarize this point of the argument, the devaru objectify sharing relationships between Nayaka and to arrive by projection at the idea of devaru. The idea of ''person'' as a ''mental representation'' applied to the other beings. A hill devaru, say, objectifies Nayaka relationships with the hill; it makes known the relationworld in pursuit of knowledge is modernist. I argue that Nayaka do not individuate but, in the sense specified ships between Nayaka and that hill. Nayaka maintain social relationships with other beings not because, as above, dividuate other beings in their environment. They are attentive to, and work towards making, relat-Tylor holds, they a priori consider them persons. As and when and because they engage in and maintain relaednesses. As they move and generally act in the environment, they are attentive to mutual behaviors and tionships with other beings, they constitute them as kinds of person: they make them ''relatives'' by sharing events. Periodically, they invite local devaru to visit with them and thus make them persons. They do not 16. This is a common phenomenon among hunter-gatherers, who regard them as persons and subsequently some of them have what Alan Barnard called ''a universal kinship system'' (1981); as relatives, as Durkheim maintains. In one basic sense Woodburn (1979) described this system as one in which everybody of this complex notion, devaru are relatives in the litwithin the political community is regarded as kin. eral sense of being ''that or whom one interrelates 17. The name Nayaka is mostly used and was probably introduced by surrounding people.
with'' (not in the reduced modern English sense of ''hu-S74 c ur ren t an thr o po lo g y Volume 40, Supplement, February 1999 mans connected with others by blood or affinity''). 18 but they preserve some ''information'' (pictures more than words, motion pictures more than pictures). They They are superrelatives who both need and can help Nayaka in extraordinary ways.
''put the viewer into the scene'' (p. 282) by inducing ''not an illusion of reality but an awareness of being in the world'' (p. 284). They ''transmit to the next generadevaru in-the-world tion the tricks of the human trade. The labors of the first perceivers are spared their descendants. The exDevaru exist in the world, according to Nayaka, and this view is comprehensible in terms of Gibson's (1979) tracting and abstracting of the invariants that specify the environment are made vastly easier with these aids ecological approach to visual perception (introduced and popularized among anthropologists by Ingold [e.g., to comprehension'' (p. 284) .
Events are ecologically perceivable as ''any change of 1992, 1996; see Croll and Parkin 1992]). Gibson concerns himself with ''ambient vision,'' ''obtained as the a substance, place, or object, chemical, mechanical, or biophysical. The change may be slower or fast, reversobserver is turning his head and looking around,'' the vision by which people (like other animals) perceive ible or nonreversible, repeating or nonrepeating. Events include what happens to objects in general, plus what their environment in everyday life. He reconceptualizes the environment in ecological terms. It is permanent in the animate objects make happen. Events are nested within superordinate events. . . . Events of different some respects and changing in others; ''the 'permanent objects' of the world are actually only objects that per-sorts are perceived as such . . .'' (p. 242). While Gibson's analysis explicitly focuses on things (evincing Western sist for a very long time'' (p. 13). It consists of ''places, attached objects, objects and substances . . . together biases), his thesis is concerned with things and events, and using his language my argument is that Nayaka fowith events, which are changes of these things'' (p. 240). People perceive these things by registering their ''rela-cus on events. Their attention is educated to dwell on events. They are attentive to the changes of things in tive persistence'' (or persistence-under-change, or ''invariances'') and ''relative change'' (or change-above-the world in relation to changes in themselves. As they move and act in the forest, they pick up information persistence, or ''variances''). Things are perceived in terms of what they afford the actor-perceiver because about the relative variances in the flux of the interrelatedness between themselves and other things against relof what they are for him (p. 138).
19 Their ''affordance,'' as Gibson calls it, ''cuts across the dichotomy of subjec-ative invariances. When they pick up a relatively changing thing with their relatively changing selves-and, all tive-objective. . . . It is equally a fact of the environment as a fact of behavior. It is both physical and psy-the more, when it happens in a relatively unusual manner-they regard as devaru this particular thing within chical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the environment and to the observer'' (p. 123).
this particular situation. This is another sense of the complex notion of devaru, and it arises from the stories ''Meaning'' is not ''imposed'' on things-it is not pregiven in consciousness-but ''discovered'' in the course which Nayaka tell.
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For example, one Nayaka woman, Devi (age 40), of action; it is also ''both physical and psychical, yet neither.'' There is endless ''information'' in the envi-pointed to a particular stone-standing next to several other similar stones on a small mud platform among ronment, by which Gibson means ''the specification of the observer's environment, not . . . of the observer's the huts-and said that she had been digging deep down for roots in the forest when suddenly ''this devaru came receptors or sense organs'' (p. 242). People continuously ''pick up'' information in acting within the environ-towards her.'' Another man, Atti-Mathen (age 70), pointed to a stone standing next to the aforementioned ment, by means of ''attention.'' Gibsonian ''attention'' is ''a skill that can be educated'' (p. 246) to pick up infor-one and said that his sister-in-law had been sitting under a tree, resting during a foray, when suddenly ''this mation that is more and more subtle, elaborate, and precise (p. 245). Knowing is developing this skill; knowing devaru jumped onto her lap.'' The two women had brought the stone devaru back to their places ''to live'' is continuous with perceiving, of which it is an extension.
with them. The particular stones were devaru as they ''came towards'' and ''jumped on'' Nayaka. The many According to Gibson, attention is ''educated'' through practice and also by means of ''aids to perceiving'' such other stones in the area were not devaru but simply stones. Ojibwa approach stones in a similar way: Halloas stories and models of things, words and pictures. These are ''not in themselves knowledge, as we are well recounts how he once asked an old Ojibwa man whether ''all the stones we see about us here are alive.'' tempted to think. All they can do is facilitate knowing'' (p. 258). They can never ''copy'' or ''represent'' reality, Though stones are grammatically animate in Ojibwa, the man (Hallowell recalls) ''reflected a long while and then replied, 'No! But some are ' '' (1960:24) . From the to be ones which ''move'' and ''open a mouth'' towards siveness and engagement between things, events, moreover, which prototypically involve the actor-perceiver. Ojibwa (p. 25).
The same underlying narrative recurs as Nayaka re-Discriminating devaru is contingent on ''affordances'' of environmental events and things and (as I shall next late to animal devaru in-the-world. The following four anecdotes on elephants provide us with a clearer under-argue) on enhanced attention to them through particular traditions of practice. standing of the complexity of Nayaka perceptions of devaru in-the-world. One man, Chathen (age 50), whose home stood next to the one in which I lived, said one devaru as performance characters morning that during the night he had seen an elephant devaru ''walking harmlessly'' between our homes, and Devaru performances are pivotal in developing attention to devaru in-the-world and reproducing concepts of this is how he knew, he explained, that it was a devaru, not just an elephant. Another man, Chellan (age 35), devaru as objectifications of relationships. These performances are complex affairs which, in the modernist similarly related, by way of giving another example, how once an elephant devaru which passed by him as sense, involve ''spirit-possession'' by devaru but also a great deal more, including a communal social gathering, he was walking in the forest searching for honey ''looked straight into his eyes.'' Like the stones, these healing, an altered state of consciousness, communication with predecessors, secondary burial for people who particular elephants were devaru as they ''walked harmlessly'' and ''looked straight into the eyes,'' that is, as have died since the previous event, and music and dancing. Each affair spans two days and the intervening and when they responsively related to Nayaka. In contrast, Kungan (age 50) once took me along on a gathering night. Nayaka hold them every year or so in each village, one place after the other, each attended by people expedition, and on hearing an elephant and knowing by its sounds that it was alone and dangerous, he turned from the whole area who participate in several events of this sort every year. Nayaka do not seem to refer to away and avoided it. He did not engage with this elephant and referred to it not as ''elephant devaru'' but this event by any single name or mark it off from everyday experience. ''Pandalu,'' the word I apply to the afsimply as ''elephant.'' The lack of mutual engagement prevented the kind of relatedness which would have fair, is sometimes used for the purpose, referring to the hut which is specially built for the event as accommoconstituted this elephant (at this moment) as devaru while it might be perceived as devaru on other occa-dation for the visiting devaru.
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In examining one pandalu event, limiting myself to sions.
A more complex situation is exemplified in an ac-devaru alone, I adopt a performance-centered approach influenced by, among others Tambiah (1970, 1985 count by Atti-Mathen of how an elephant trampled two huts in a neighboring Nayaka place, luckily not injuring [1979] ). Unlike the Geertzian tradition, this approach focuses on what the pandalu does rather than what it Nayaka, who happened to be away that night. AttiMathen referred to the offending elephant simply as ''el-means. It focuses on the pandalu as an event in-theworld itself, not a ''text.'' It is concerned with the exephant.'' Several months later, during a devaru performance, he asked the devaru involved if they had ''had tent to which such events, instead of referring to or talking about, do something in-the-world. I go farther, something to do'' with the event in question. The devaru replied that they had ''done it'' in response to a as I cast the pandalu (following Nayaka) right away as an experience, a performance, a social event in-theNayaka aaita (a fault, deviation from the customary). The devaru did not specify the nature of the fault on world, which is continuous and coherent with and even nested within other Nayaka experiences. (I do not cast this occasion-though sometimes they did, mentioning, for instance, that Nayaka had offered less food it as ''ritual,'' as opposed to ''practice,'' and then correctively adopt a performance-centered approach to it.) The during the last devaru performance than in previous times or had started the performance later. This particu-examination fills a lacuna in the work of Ingold (e.g., 1996) , who, like Gibson, pays inadequate attention to lar elephant (in this particular situation) was neither avoided nor shared with. It was perceived as an instru-interhuman ''action'' in-the-world in favor of ''action'' towards other species; 22 clearly, action towards fellow ment, an object, which devaru used in the course of interrelating with Nayaka. In this case, illustrating the humans constitutes an important part of one's ''environment.'' Nayaka view at its limits, Nayaka still frame what happened in terms of mutually responsive events, but they June 9, 1979, Kungan's place 23 (where I lived at the time with his family): People arrive casually during the are connected narratively in a more complex way.
These four stories show how elephants (as one exam-day, each family at its own time. They engage with the local residents in everyday activities, chatting, sharple among others) may be regarded as persons or as objects, depending on what happens between them and ing food, going to the river, fetching firewood, etc. Late Nayaka, which itself depends on the ''affordances'' of events involving elephants and people. An important situations. They are events involving mutual respon-in the afternoon, amidst the action, Kungan (age 50) occasionally by names; sometimes only by their dividuated characters (as ''the one who always requests wild stands in front of the devaru hut and bows in four directions, inviting the area's devaru to come. A few people fowl for food'' or ''waves a knife,'' etc.) and sometimes just as devaru in general. The most vivid and generally shift the devaru stones-originally brought from the forest-from their regular place on a mud platform known devaru are hill devaru, whose existence appears to go far back into the past. (Among neighboring hunteramong the houses to the area in front of the hut. They put next to them various other devaru things (including gatherer Pandaram and Paliyan, hill chavu and hill devi are also singled out [Morris 1981 , Gardner 1991 .) Other knives, bells, bracelets, cups, and elephant-and humanshaped figurines of Hindu origin), taking these things vivid devaru are elephant devaru, minor Hindu deities worshiped locally, and a deity of the Kurumba people out of a box in which they are kept for safety between these events. Food and betel-nuts are laid in front of all who lived in the locality several decades before. Generally, the more devaru appear year after year and are rethese devaru, as well as Hindu puja items purchased with money collected in advance from the partici-lated with, the more vividly they are invoked, the more they are known, the more, in a sense, they ''exist.'' pants.
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As night falls, several men start going on and off into Hardly anything is said about devaru in myth or other oral tradition either within the performance or outside trances, usually one at a time, which they will continue doing throughout the night and the following day. Each it (Morris reports the same for Hill Pandaram [1981: 208] ). one wraps himself with a special cloth, lifts branches and waves them in the air in four directions, bows in
The devaru evoked often improvise on the same repetitive phrases. The saying, the voicing, the gesturing four directions inviting devaru to come, and shakes himself into a trance. Intermittently, rhythmic drum-are important. These principal aspects of their behavior are, in Bateson's term (1979), meta-communication, ming, flute-and-drum music, and dances help set the mood. As the performers fall into trance, they ''bring to namely, communicating that devaru are communicating, because the devaru are present as they move, talk, life'' a variety of devaru. 25 The performers are evaluated in terms of how skillfully they ''bring'' the devaru ''to make gestures, etc. They are present as they communicate and socially interact with Nayaka. At peak times, life'' at the same time as attendant people engage with the devaru which the performers evoke.
everyone gathers around the visiting devaru, taking an active part in the conversation or just closely listening Devaru of all sorts can ''come to life'' during the devaru performance. Nayaka extend them an open invita-to it. At other times, only a few people do this while the others busy themselves with their own domestic affairs. tion by the recurring bows in the four directions. Nayaka engage with the devaru characters who appear, The conversation has to be kept going at all times.
When it slackens, the devaru complain and urge more who are devaru as they appear and engage with Nayaka. Nayaka identify each visiting devaru by its dividuated people to join in. At the extreme, at dull moments in the heat of the day and deep in the night, this or that personality: by how it idiosyncratically interrelates with Nayaka (how it laughs with, talks with, gets angry Nayaka grudgingly comes forward and engages the devaru in conversation. (I became helpful at various points at, responds to Nayaka, etc.). Sometimes, various devaru come together in a gang, evoked by the same per-in this event, letting Nayaka go about their business as I recorded and listened to the devaru by myself.) Keepformer, who then switches gestures, speech styles, dialects, and even languages (Nayaka, Malayalam, and ing the conversation going is important because it keeps the Nayaka-devaru interaction and in a sense the deTamil) from one sentence to the next.
26 Some devaru are vivified by the performers with great finesse, and they varu themselves ''alive.'' Conversation with the devaru is highly personal, inare recognized by most or all Nayaka. Other devaru are so crudely specified that they are barely distinguishable, formal, and friendly, including joking, teasing, bargaining, etc. In its idiomatic structure it resembles the and they are identified by few Nayaka, and sometimes differently. The devaru are objectified by kinship terms; demand-sharing discourse which is characteristic of Nayaka and hunter-gatherers generally (see Bird-David 24. See Bird-David (1996) for a detailed examination of how Nayaka 1990). With numerous repetitions or minor variations incorporate Hindu influences into their pandalu tradition. on a theme, Nayaka and devaru nag and tease, praise 25. They also ''bring to life'' predecessors, who for lack of space are and flatter, blame and cajole each other, expressing and not discussed here.
demanding care and concern. For example, Nayaka 26. Similarly, Brightman (1993:172) describes the Rock Cree's ''shaking lodge ritual'' as follows: ''[It] features a recurring stock of stress that they are taking proper care of the devaru (or characters, variable to some degree among different operators and apologizing for not giving more or moaning about not different performances by the same operator. Many characters posbeing able to give more, etc.) and complain that the desess individuating speech characteristics, familiar to the audience varu, in turn, do not take care of them (or not enough from hearsay and from other performances. . . . Today, most spirits or not as in previous years, etc.). The devaru stress how speak in Cree, and others use English, French, Saulteaux, and Chipewyan, or unknown human languages'' (p. 172). ''During the much they care for Nayaka and request better hospitalcourse of the performance, they [the spirits] conversed among ity (more offerings, an earlier start for the event, more themselves, with the operator, and with members of the audience dancing, etc.). The Nayaka request cures from illnesses.
outside, responding to questions either in known languages or in
The ordinary round of everyday affairs continues durunintelligible speech requiring translation by other spirits or by the operator'' (p. 171).
ing the two days of the pandalu. Domestic chores are not marginalized on account of the occasion but consti-to pursue individual interests within the confines of a relatedness-to negotiate for what they need while situte a significant part of its structure. Throughout the two days, Nayaka families go on with their domestic multaneously taking care to reproduce the framing relatedness within which they do so. From year upon year activities, frequently sharing with each other and, in some ways, with their devaru visitors, too. The devaru of conversations, which in part repeat themselves and in part change, participants are increasingly sensitized hut resembles ordinary Nayaka dwellings. Some men occasionally take naps there, sharing the hut with the to pick up information on the emergent, processive, historical, and reciprocal qualities of relatednesses. In sum, devaru. In the morning, when people go to wash in the river and bring back water, they bow in the four direc-we can say that the pandalu involves ''making [devaru] alive,'' that is, raising people's awareness of their existions, inviting local devaru to join them. Women on their way back sprinkle water from their vessels in the tence in-the-world and, dialectically, producing and being produced by this, socializing with them. four directions, sharing the water with devaru around. In the course of conversation devaru request betel-nuts from their Nayaka interlocutor. One elderly Nayaka woman falls into a trance. She does not utter coherent Animism as Relational Epistemology words; in her frenzy she only sweeps the ground around the devaru hut and starts to undress (which bystanders Within the objectivist paradigm informing previous attempts to resolve the ''animism'' problem, it is hard to stop her from doing). A joint meal of rice, cooked by Kungan's daughter and her husband, brings the event to make sense of people's ''talking with'' things, or singing, dancing, or socializing in other ways for which a close. The food is shared equally among those present, and some food is spread in the four directions.
''talking'' is used here as shorthand. According to this paradigm, learning involves acquiring knowledge of The pandalu makes known the Nayaka-devaru relatednesses and at the same time reproduces them. Ob-things through the separation of knower and known and often, furthermore, by breaking the known down into jectified as kinship relationships, the relatednesses reconstitute all the participants as sonta and each of them its parts in order to know it. To study, say, the tropical forest-the kind of forest in which Nayaka live and as a person (Nayaka person, hill person, stone person, etc.). Furthermore, the pandalu constitutes (in the Gib-with which they ''talk''-botanists of this persuasion cut down a strip of trees with machetes, sort out the sonian sense) ''aids to perceiving'' that ''put the viewer into the scene'' (Gibson 1979: 282, cited above). It ''edu-fallen vegetation into kinds, place characteristic bits and pieces of each kind in small bags, and take them cates the attention'' to perceive and specify the environment (while engaging with it) in a relational way. The out of the forest to a herbarium for botanical classification (see Richards 1952) . Compared with their method, pandalu ''preserves information'' (as effectively as books and even motion pictures); moreover, it encour-''talking with'' trees seems a ritual with no possible connection to the serious business of acquiring knowlages the learner to engage interactively with this information and so to experience it socially. The engage-edge of trees.
If ''cutting trees into parts'' epitomizes the modernist ment with devaru characters ''educates the attention'' to notice devaru as they interact with oneself. It im-epistemology, ''talking with trees,'' I argue, epitomizes Nayaka animistic epistemology. ''Talking'' is shortproves the skill of picking up information about the engagement itself, within its confines, from an engaged hand for a two-way responsive relatedness with a treerather than ''speaking'' one-way to it, as if it could lisviewpoint.
If Nayaka only subsisted by hunting and gathering in ten and understand. ''Talking with'' stands for attentiveness to variances and invariances in behavior and their environment, they might perceive only its utilitarian affordances: an animal as something edible; a stone response of things in states of relatedness and for getting to know such things as they change through the as something throwable; a rock as something one can shelter under. Within the practice of engaging with de-vicissitudes over time of the engagement with them. To ''talk with a tree''-rather than ''cut it down''-is to varu characters in the pandalu they are educated to perceive that animals, stones, rocks, etc., are things one perceive what it does as one acts towards it, being aware concurrently of changes in oneself and the tree. It is excan relate with-that they have relational affordances, that is, what happens to them (or how they change) can pecting response and responding, growing into mutual responsiveness and, furthermore, possibly into mutual affect and be affected by what happens to people (or how they change): an animal-avoiding-me in relation to me-responsibility.
If the object of modernist epistemology is a totalizing upsetting-the-animal, a stone-coming-towards-me in relation to me-reaching-for-the-stone, a rock-securing-me scheme of separated essences, approached ideally from a separated viewpoint, the object of this animistic in relation to me-seeking-a-shelter. Participants learn from conversing and sharing with devaru characters to knowledge is understanding relatedness from a related point of view within the shifting horizons of the related discriminate mutually responsive changes in themselves and things they relate with; they become increas-viewer. Knowledge in the first case is having, acquiring, applying, and improving representations of things iningly aware of the webs of relatedness between themselves and what is around them. From the bargaining the-world (see Rorty 1980) . Knowledge in the second case is developing the skills of being in-the-world with and demand-sharing with devaru characters they learn S78 c ur ren t an thr o po lo g y Volume 40, Supplement, February 1999 other things, making one's awareness of one's environ-utilizing and respecting animated ''things,'' self-interest and the cooperation within which that self-interest ment and one's self finer, broader, deeper, richer, etc. Knowing, in the second case, grows from and is main-can be achieved. 29 Furthermore, relational epistemologies function in taining relatedness with neighboring others. It involves dividuating the environment rather than dichotomizing diverse contexts where other epistemologies enjoy authority, including Western contexts (to a much greater it and turning attention to ''we-ness,'' which absorbs differences, rather than to ''otherness,'' which high-extent than the authoritative status of science permits).
When (going back to Guthrie's examples) we animate lights differences and eclipses commonalities. Against ''I think, therefore I am'' stand ''I relate, therefore I am'' the computers we use, the plants we grow, and the cars we drive, we relationally frame them. We learn what and ''I know as I relate.'' Against materialistic framing of the environment as discrete things stands rela-they do in relation to what we do, how they respond to our behavior, how they act towards us, what their situationally framing the environment as nested relatednesses. Both ways are real and valid. Each has its lim-tional and emergent behavior (rather than their constitutive matter) is. As Nayaka get to know animated asits and its strengths.
Framing the environment relationally does not con-pects of their environment, so we get to know these animated things by focusing on our relatedness with stitute Nayaka's only way of knowing their environment, though in my understanding they regard it as au-them within the confines of that relatedness from a relational viewpoint. This sort of relational framing is arthoritative among their other ways. Nor is it unique to Nayaka. I would hypothesize that relational epistemol-ticulated with other epistemologies in complex, variable, and shifting ways that deserve study. (The ogies of this kind enjoy authoritative status in cultures of peoples we call hunter-gatherers. These peoples nor-example of ethologists mentioned earlier is a case in point: in regarding as persons the study animals with malize sharing with fellow persons. They engage intimately with their environment (if only periodically which they live, they frame them relationally in addition to making them the objects of their scientific while on a break from other economic pursuits [BirdDavid 1992b] ). They celebrate animistic performances. study.)
As a hypothesis, furthermore, I am willing to agree Their performance traditions-for example, the Cree ''shaking tent ritual'' (e.g., Hallowell 1960, Feit 1994, with Tylor, not least because Guthrie goes some way towards substantiating the point, that the tendency to Brightman 1993), the !Kung ''medicine dance'' (e.g., Marshall 1962 , Katz 1982 , the Hadza ''sacred epeme animate things is shared by humans. However, this common tendency, I suggest, is engendered by human dance'' (see Woodburn 1982) , the Batek ''fruit-season's singing session'' (see Endicott 1979) , and Paliyan and socially biased cognitive skills, not by ''survival'' of mental confusion (Tylor) or by wrong perceptual Pandaram ''spirit possession'' (see Gardner 1991, Morris 1981)-are functionally similar to the Nayaka pandalu. guesses (Guthrie). Recent work relates the evolution of human cognition to social interaction with fellow huThese performances involve the visiting of superpersons who appear through trance and dance or make mans. Its underlying argument is that interpersonal dealings, requiring strategic planning and anticipation their voices heard. 27 The people regard these superpersons as friends and relatives and often address and refer of action-response-reaction, are more demanding and challenging than problems of physical survival (Humto them by kinship terms. They approach them in a personal, friendly, and immediate way. These events are phrey 1976). Cognitive skills have accordingly evolved within and for a social kind of engagement and are ''sothe central communal affairs of these communities and often the main celebrational means by which they sus-cially biased'' (Goody 1995). We spontaneously employ these skills in situations when we cannot control or totain their senses of identity.
28 Each event constitutes a ''participation frame'' (Lave and Wenger 1991) which, tally predict our interlocutor's behavior, when its behavior is not predetermined but in ''conversation'' with together with the participation frame of hunting-gathering practice itself, nurtures a complex articulation of our own. We employ these skills in these situations, irrespective of whether they involve humans or other beskills, a double-bind engagement which co-privileges ings (the respective classification of which is sometimes part of reflective knowing, following rather than 27. In some cases devaru are additionally invoked by objects, with preceding the engagement situation). We do not first which one talks, eats, sings, dances, etc. This is less common than personify other entities and then socialize with them their invocation by performance but of considerable theoretical importance.
but personify them as, when, and because we socialize 28. At their respective times of study, these events were frequently with them. Recognizing a ''conversation'' with a held, for example, weekly among !Kung, monthly among Hadza, counter-being-which amounts to accepting it into feland ''whenever need arises'' among Pandaram. They spanned a sig-lowship rather than recognizing a common essencenificant stretch of time, for example, ''the whole night'' among makes that being a self in relation with ourselves. !Kung, ''two to three nights in succession'' among Hadza, and ''from evening into the night'' among Paliyan. The events involved the entire community as active spectators and a considerable proportion as performers, for example, ''one-third of the men '' among 29. Compare Briggs (1982) and Guemple (1988) on the teaching of Inuit children to relate with other people in a double-binding way !Kung, ''one-eighth of the men'' among Pandaram, and ''28% of the adults'' among Paliyan. In the case of Nayaka, about one-fifth of and Myers's study (1986) of tenuous articulation of personal autonomy and relatedness among the Australian Pintupi. the men acted as performers.
Finally, the common human disposition to frame ernist personhood concepts and perceptions of the environment as universal, have grossly misunderstood things relationally in these situations is culturally mediated and contextualized in historically specific ways animism as simple religion and a failed epistemology.
(not least in relation with cultural concepts of the person). A diversity of animisms exists, each animistic project with its local status, history, and structure (in 30 How do they articulate in each case with other cosmologies and epistemol-epistemology. The massive conversion of ontological questions into epistemological ones is the hallmark of ogies?
31 How do animistic projects relate to fetish practices? Surely, however, the most intriguing question is modernist philosophy. She does not accept the modernist answers, but the question how we come to know why and how the modernist project estranged itself from the tendency to animate things, if it is indeed uni-things is taken as a natural one to be put with reference to the Nayaka, who are thus encompassed by this amversal. How and why did it stigmatize ''animistic language'' as a child's practice, against massive evidence biguous ''we'' and expected to provide an answer for ''us.'' The answer is that knowing is relating and the (see Guthrie 1993) to the contrary? How did it succeed in delegitimating animism as a valid means to knowl-cogito is relational. The problem remains framed in terms of knowledge even though the answer could be edge, constantly fending off the impulse to deploy it and regarding it as an ''incurable disease'' (see Kennedy 1992 taken to imply that knowledge, let alone the cogito, has little to do with it. Anthropologists persist in thinking and Masson and McCarthy 1995)? The answers are bound to be complex. Ernest Gellner (1988) argued that that in order to explain a non-Western ontology we must derive it from (or reduce it to) an epistemology. nothing less than ''a near-miraculous concatenation of circumstances'' can explain the cognitive shift that oc-Animism is surely an ontology, concerned with being and not with how we come to know it. Bird-David falls curred in Western Europe around the 17th century. Ironically, history has it that Descartes-a reclusive into the Tylorian trap and feels compelled to assess the validity of this epistemology and to justify it on the baman-was once accidentally locked in a steam room, where under hallucination he had the dualist vision on sis of its cognitive naturalness.
The author has a fondness for scare quotes, but I am which the modern project is founded (see Morris 1991: 6). Can it be that a Tylorian kind of ''dream thesis'' afraid this sort of pocket deconstruction is hardly enough to keep one safe from essentialization and modhelps explain not the emergence of primitive animism but, to the contrary, the modernist break from it? ernist projection. The notion of ''hunter-gatherers'' is a case in point. Bird-David finds the concept suspicious, but all the same she attributes to hunter-gatherers a number of characteristics also to be found in many horConclusions ticultural societies. There is then a suggestion that the prevalence of epistemologies of the kind described for How we get to know things is nested within culture and practice and takes multiple forms. Nayaka relationally the Nayaka is somehow (causally?) derived from the fact that ''[hunter-gatherers] normalize sharing with felframe what they are concerned about as their authoritative (but not only) way of getting to know things. They low persons''; in other words, sharing is taken as the essence of hunter-gatherers' social life. This seems close seek to understand relatednesses from a related point of view within the shifting horizons of the related viewer. to the traditional notion of a metaphoric projection of human relations onto the environment-an idea which Their relational epistemology, their study of how things-in-situations relate to the actor-perceiver and, has been cogently criticized by Ingold. Also, she dislikes dualisms and dichotomies, but this does not prevent her from the actor-perceiver's point of view, to each other, is embodied in the practices which Tylor christened from posing a dichotomy between a dichotomous modernist epistemology and a non-dichotomous relational ''primitive animism,'' articulated with a relational personhood concept and a relational perception of the en-one. She objects, in particular, to the concepts of subject and object-but whence comes the notion of ''objectivironment. Previous theories of animism, taking modfication''?
30. For example, compare hunter-gatherer animism with premod-I find the attempt to combine Strathern's and Ingold's ern Western ''animism'' as described in Merchant (1980) and Burke theories very problematic. The ''dividual'' of the former (1972). shares only its name with Bird-David's, among other What are the limits of a relational epistemology? Bird-David's relatednesses are predicated on the absorption of difference by commonalities and togethernesses.
In order to prove that animism is not a (mistaken) cultural epistemology, Bird-David must argue that it is a There is here, then, in contrast to Strathern's usage, an implicit assumption that the fundamental or prototypi-natural human attitude. In so doing, she manages to culturalize and particularize the ''modernist project'' cal mode of relation is ''we-ness'' as sameness.
Bird-David's is yet another voicing of the recent wide-but only at the price of a prior naturalization and universalization of the animist stance. Thus the relational spread sentiment against difference which sees it as inimical to immanence, as if difference were a stigma of epistemology is ontologized but in terms of a concept of human nature which is firmly situated within the transcendence and alterity a harbinger of oppression. Is not this sentiment being here projected onto what modernist privileging of epistemology. hunter-gatherers are supposed to experience? All difference is read as opposition and all opposition as the absence of a relation: ''to oppose'' is taken as synonymous a lf h ornborg Human Ecology Division, Lund University, Finngatan with ''to exclude''-a strange idea which I can only attribute to the guilty supposition that others conceive 16, S-223 62 Lund, Sweden. 11 iv 98 otherness as we do. Well, they don't: others are ''other'' precisely because they have other ''others.'' This is a welcome contribution in several respects: it readdresses the difference between the ''pre-modern'' I find Bird-David's idea that devaru are situational and event-determined appearances inspiring, and the and the ''modern'' in an age when such polarities are increasingly brushed aside as modern constructions; it point that devaru are persons insofar as they engage in relationships with people rather than the other way argues for a connection between studies of human-environmental relations and the more recently constituted around is extremely well taken. But I also have several questions here.
anthropological discourse on personhood; finally, in seriously considering the validity of pre-Cartesian episteBird-David objects to Hallowell's usage of ''otherthan-human persons'' on the ground that it betrays a mologies it shows how anthropology might resuscitate its now foundering critique of modernity. In all these concern with classes (human/non-human), and she prefers to call devaru ''superpersons.'' But what is the ''per-respects I am fundamentally in agreement with the author (see Hornborg 1994 Hornborg , 1996 Hornborg , 1998 . My remarks will son'' that makes devaru ''super''persons-the human person? By the same token, the idea that devaruhood is rather focus on some points which she might have carried further. a context-bound, situational ascription seems to rely on an implicit contrast with context-free avaruhood.
To begin with, I would have liked to see a distinction between ''relatedness'' or ''relational epistemology,'' on The idea that devaru are objectifications of sharing relationships seems to fly in the face of the ''more com-the one hand, and ritualized animism such as pandalu, on the other. Bird-David conflates the two rather than plex situation'' (more complex for whom?) of the elephant devaru related to the animal which trampled the problematizing their relationship. The former evokes a very general human experience that has inspired, for inhuts. Bird-David says that this case illustrates ''the Nayaka view at its limits,'' but this sounds like blaming stance, the long-standing phenomenological critique of Cartesian objectivism from within modern Western sothe Nayaka for the limits of her own theoretical view.
Bird-David emphasizes the particularistic, event-de-ciety itself; the latter is a specific cultural expression in certain pre-modern societies that may tell us something rived nature of the devaru but also says that many of those who appear in the performance are very crudely about ''relatedness'' but cannot qualify as simply an index of it. A relevant question would have been under specified and that some are recognized only as ' ' 'devaru' in general. '' But what is a devaru in general? And what conditions ''relatedness'' must be objectified in ritual. Bird-David's own datum that the Nayaka engage if interaction with devaru is a way of ''educating attention'' to discriminate changes in the relationships be-intimately with their environment ''only periodically while on a break from other economic pursuits'' sugtween humans and the environment, then the sketchy specification of some devaru would make them quite gests that pandalu may be an attempt to revitalize an everyday relatedness that is threatening to dissolve or useless.
In her conclusion, Bird-David says that our human so-slip away.
If the presence or absence of ''relatedness'' is a general cially biased cognitive skills would be spontaneously (naturally) applied in situations ''when we cannot con-existential problem, Bird-David has addressed nothing less than the problem of modernity itself. Yet there are trol or totally predict our interlocutor's behavior.'' Applied to non-human beings, however, these skills would few indications that the argument belongs within a wider tradition than a rather parochial, anthropological give us something quite similar to the theory of magic as a counter-anxiety device. In like manner, the men-concern with animism. There is no mention, for instance, of Weber's ''disenchantment,'' Merleau-Ponty's tion of the devaru-ization of unusual relatednesses strikes me as similar to the old idea that ''primitives'' ''being-in-the-world,'' or Buber's ''I-Thou'' relationships. These are connections which deserve to be elaboattribute a spirit to anything out of the ordinary. We might also inquire about the respective limits and rated. It is curious how the phenomenological jargon on being ''in-the-world'' has infiltrated ecological anthro-tial specifics of place that yields conditions conducive to ''relatedness.'' If this has been stigmatized as ''a pology (see also Ingold 1996) without any mention of the sources of these concepts (see Gooch 1998).
child's practice,'' as does indeed Piaget's bourgeois concept of maturity, is this not because we are all born preThe example of the ethologists' coming to view their animal objects as subjects illustrates how ''relatedness'' modern? Abstraction, detachment, and objectification are products of modern, disembedding middle-and upis something that people are capable of achieving in particular experiential contexts of some minimal duration. per-class biographies.
Bird-David observes that relational epistemologies It is undoubtedly everywhere fundamental to the local and embedded dimensions of human life. Why exoticize are performative, as their significance hinges on what they do rather than on what they represent. Ironically, it into something that ''they''-''the Nayaka''-have? Once again, the anthropological gaze risks reducing it-at another logical level, so is objectivist knowledge, but precisely by not admitting it. By posing as mere repreself to the class perspective of urban cosmopolitans making careers out of objectifying the rural and the sentation, it performs an act of alienation, a relinquishment of responsibility, through which a disemlocal.
There is a contradiction between Bird-David's con-bodied, instrumental rationality is set free to go about its business in the world. cluding assumption that ''the modernist project estranged itself from the tendency to animate things'' and Finally, it may restrict our field of vision to conclude that the human tendency to animate things is engenher earlier observation that we may animate our computers and cars. ''Animation'' is one of Ellen's (1988) dered by ''socially biased cognitive skills.'' If human cognition has evolved to equip us for ''interpersonal criteria of fetishism, and fetishism to Marx was central to modern capitalism. It is indeed relevant to ask how dealings'' with unpredictable interlocutors, it may just as well have been because ecological relationships are animism relates to fetishism. There is a difference between representing relations between people as if fundamentally communicative (von Uexkü ll 1982 (von Uexkü ll [1940 ). Ingold (1996) argues that social relations are a they were relations between things (Marxian fetishism) and experiencing relations to things as if they were subset of ecological relations and that there is a sense in which non-human creatures are also ''persons.'' We relations to people (animation). The former is a cognitive/ideological illusion, the latter a condition of could thus turn the evolutionary argument around and suggest that human sociability was engendered by cogphenomenological/experiential resonance. I have suggested (Hornborg 1992) that ''machine fetishism,'' at nitive skills that were ecologically biased. This would provide an even stronger case for the essential validity the ideological level, is as crucial to capitalism as money or commodity fetishism. Machines can un-of animism. doubtedly also be animated in a phenomenological sense, as Bird-David suggests. We probably need to distinguish between the animation of living things such as tim i ng old Department of Social Anthropology, University of trees (animism, more narrowly defined) and that of nonliving things such as stones or machines (fetishism). Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, England (Tim.Ingold@man.ac.uk) . 15 iv 98 Cartesian objectivism and fetishism here emerge as structural inversions of one another: the former denies agency and subjectivity in living beings, whereas the I am in broad sympathy with the argument of this admirable paper and confine my comment to the one point latter attributes such qualities to dead objects. In this framework, a more strictly defined category of animism on which I have a substantive disagreement. The point is relatively tangential to the argument as a whole but would be reserved for the intermediate and quite reasonable assumption that all living things are subjects.
has important implications for the directions in which it might be further pursued. Bird-David is right, I think, The epistemological predicament codified by Descartes was not so much an innovative, ''cognitive shift'' to point out that the difference between hunter-gatherers and citizens of modern Western nations is not that from animism to objectivism as the emergence-or unprecedented generalization-of a social condition of the former have a relational epistemology while the latter have signed up for the modernist project. After all, alienation. Rather than a cerebral innovation that has since diffused, it is a reflection of a set of social circum-a great many contemporary hunter-gatherers are citizens of Western nation-states. The difference is rather stances that is continually being reproduced and expanded. Bird-David's programmatic ambition to artic-that within the context of the modern state and its political, economic, and educational institutions, relaulate environmental relations and personhood is supremely worthwhile, but where in this text are the tional ways of knowing have lost much of their authority. But they continue to operate nonetheless and insights on personhood that she wishes to employ? A highly relevant aspect of personhood which might have remain deeply embedded in the experience of everyday life. As a speculative hypothesis, Bird-David suggests illuminated the relationist/objectivist contrast is the tendency of ''non-Western'' (local?) people to anchor that such ways of knowing are, indeed, common to human beings everywhere. I am inclined to agree. I do not their selves in concrete rather than abstract referencepoints (see Shweder and Bourne 1984, Hornborg 1994) . believe, however, that the explanation for this is to be found in theories of the evolution of social intelligence It is the long immersion in the concrete and experien-of the kind originally propounded by Humphrey (1976) Goody (1985) . These theories rest fair and square on a modernThe kind of responsiveness envisaged in anticipatory interactive planning, however, is fundamentally differist conception of mind and behavior which flies in the face of the relational view of personal being and envi-ent from what Bird-David has in mind when she speaks of the ''two-way responsive relatedness'' to components ronmental perception to which Bird-David and I subscribe. To follow the explanatory route along which of the environment such as trees that comes from a history of intimate engagement with them. To ''talk with they beckon would lead us inevitably to the very fallacies that she correctly identifies in the work of scholars a tree,'' as she points out, is a question not of (mistakenly) attributing to it an inner intelligence and then such as Guthrie (1993) .
What Humphrey argued, in essence, was that the cog-configuring how it might decide to react to what one does but of perceiving ''what it does as one acts towards nitive demands for an individual of strategically managing interactions with conspecifics far outweighed those it, being aware concurrently of changes in oneself and the tree.'' Responsiveness, in this view, amounts to a of dealing with other components of the environment in the procurement of subsistence, and therefore the se-kind of sensory participation, a coupling of the movement of one's attention to the movement of aspects of lective pressures that drove the evolution of human intelligence were above all social rather than technical. the world. If there is intelligence at work here, it does not lie inside the head of the human actor, let alone inThis distinction between the social and technical functions of intellect is based, however, on a more funda-side the fabric of the tree. Rather, it is immanent in the total system of perception and action constituted by the mental division between the domains of society and nature. Social partners are beings with whom an co-presence of the human and the tree within a wider environment. To develop this idea further, the first individual interacts, whereas in nature there are only things that one can act upon. Yet precisely because thing we shall have to jettison is the cognitivist conception of intelligence as a mental computational device their intelligence has been designed by natural selection specifically for handling social interaction, human be-responsible for processing the data of perception and pulling the strings of action (see Ingold 1993:431). Huings are predisposed to treat objects of nature, too, as if they were social partners. And in doing so, says Hum-man beings everywhere perceive their environments in the responsive mode not because of innate cognitive phrey, ''they are sure to make mistakes.'' One of the most obvious of these mistakes, typical of ''primitive-predisposition but because to perceive at all they must already be situated in a world and committed to the reand not so primitive-peoples,'' is the ''resort to animistic thinking about natural phenomena.'' People who lationships this entails. think in this way attempt to interact with nature as they would with one another. Such attempts are quite understandable but nonetheless fallacious. ''Nature b ri an morri s Goldsmiths College, New Cross, London SE14 6NW, will not transact with men; she goes her own way regardless'' (Humphrey 1976:313) .
England. 7 iii 98 Thus for Humphrey, just as for Guthrie, animism is founded in error: the attribution of social characteristics I have read Bird-David's lucid and valuable paper with great interest and offer the following critical reflections to objects of the natural world. And for both authors the prevalence of the error is put down to evolved predispo-in the spirit of friendship:
''Modernism,'' as Bird-David defines it, implies a consitions that have a rational foundation in the calculus of selective costs and benefits. However, as Bird-David ception of the human person as involving a radical body/spirit (soul, mind?) split, a radical dualism beconvincingly shows, a relational epistemology turns the tables on such arguments. The error, it seems, lies with tween humans and nature, and the notion that the human person is an individual thing, a bounded asocial entheir originators, in their assumption that the world is divided, a priori, between the inanimate and the ani-tity (organism). These conceptions, of course, largely came out of Cartesian metaphysics and the bourgeois mate, between the non-human and the human, and between the natural and the social. But above all, they liberal theory of the 17th century and were intrinsic as ideologies to the rise of capitalism. A critique of these make the mistake of assuming that life and mind are interior properties of individuals that are given, inde-conceptions-which Bird-David links to ''current'' theory in ecology and personhood-goes back two cenpendently and in advance of their involvement in the world. Perception, then, is understood to be a matter of turies to the time of Goethe, Hegel, and Marx. Philosophers, historians, sociologists, anthropologists, constructing internal representations of what the world might be like on the basis of the limited information socialists, romantic poets, evolutionary biologists, and naturalists have long since concluded that humans are available through the senses, while action is regarded as the execution of plans arrived at through the strategic a part of nature and that people everywhere are neither disembodied egos (Descartes) nor abstract individuals manipulation of such representations. In social interaction, it is supposed, each party has to be able to repre-(the asocial organisms of bourgeois liberalism) nor simply a reflection of the commodity metaphor (Strathern) sent the likely response of the other to his or her own but intrinsically social, that is, relational, beings. The posing concepts or theories is not only undialectical but obfuscating. All relations (whether causal or social) imnotion that human persons are dividuals has thus long been established. But, of course, people are also individ-ply things, actual entities that are constituted through relations; all affordances in the environment imply uals, actual entities or unities, and must be so logically and dialectically in order to be dividual. Setting up the something-person, observer, or frog-that is environed; all difference entails at the same time a unity, individual and the dividual as if they were opposed categories, as Bird-David seems to do(?), is quite misleading. just as all unities (individuals) are at the same time dividual. Bird-David's paper conveys the impression that Indeed, as Fitz Poole and myself have both stressed, individuality is a defining feature of personhood and talking about ''things'' implies a negative, instrumental, objectivist attitude to the world. This is not only ought not to be conflated with individualism (the cultural notion that we are asocial organisms bounded by contrasted with but opposed to ''relations,'' identified with the personal and the social, which are positive and the skin). People in Western cultures, like the Nayaka and people everywhere, are dividual persons and recog-good, and reflected in Nayaka religious beliefs, which in turn reflect the ''relational epistemology'' that Birdnize themselves as such. Even the much-abused Descartes acknowledged this in his letters, but the best ac-David herself embraces. The paper is thus pervaded by Martin Buber's distinction between I-thou (relation) and count of the dividual person was given long ago by another much-maligned scholar, Radcliffe-Brown (1952: I-it (thing) . But just as social relations can be hierarchic and exploitative, so our relationship to things (indepen-194): ''The human being as a person is a complex of social relationships. He is a citizen of England, a husband dent of religion) can be what Heidegger described as primordial and poetic. The close relationship that the Nayand a father, a bricklayer, a member of a particular Methodist congregation, a voter in a certain constitu-aka have with the forest is surely not dependent upon the fact that they perceive the devaru as immanent in ency, a member of his trade union, an adherent of the Labour Party, and so on. Note that each of these descrip-the world and as persons. All people recognize things in the world, and this is expressed in language; the peotions refers to a social relationship.'' Thus ''dividual'' seems to be just a fashionable and rather scholastic syn-ple I know well-the Hill Pandaram and the peasant communities of Malawi-not only assert but celebrate onym for the person?
Bird-David seems to convey the idea that certain con-the singularity of things, recognizing that individual things as genera have their own unique powers and cepts, such as spirit, thing, religion, possession, imply a dualistic metaphysic. She thus overlooks the simple value. fact that all concepts are relational and that any distinction-male/female, humans/nature, body/mind, spirit/world, us/them-can be interpreted in various g í s li p á lss on Department of Anthropology, University of Iceland, ways. For example, the distinction many people make between god (spirit) and the finite world can either be 101 Reykjavik, Iceland. 21 iv 98 interpreted in dualistic fashion (as in Platonism, gnosticism, deism, and the more strident forms of theism) or The thesis under discussion is an intriguing one. The realities of the phenomena classically described by anviewed as a relational discontinuity (as in the Christian Neoplatonism of Eriugena and Eckhart, Hegel's philoso-thropologists by means of the concept of animism may, after all, have been seriously misconstrued. Bird-Daphy, esotericism, hermeticism, and the Creation-based spirituality of Matthew Fox) or by completely repudiat-vid's attempt to ''solve'' the problem of animism by combining environment theory and personhood theory ing dualism (as in the pantheism of Bruno, Spinoza, and Heine, the identity philosophy of Schelling, and the is, in my view, a promising one. Such an approach resonates with powerful themes in social theory-including spiritual monism of Parmenides and Advaita Vedanta). It is the same with every other concept. To suggest as the pragmatism of John Dewey, the Marxian constitutive view of the individual as an ''ensemble'' of social many postmodernists do-and Bird-David seems to be following this trail-that certain concepts (reason, cul-relations, and the Bakhtinian notion of dialogue. One of Bird-David's important achievements is to show that ture, mind, religion, spirit, nature, or what have you) imply a ''modernist'' perspective and a dualistic meta-once we abandon the dualism of nature and society, animism acquires a new meaning which seems more funphysic is rather simplistic. It all depends on how they are interpreted and used in analysis. Read in his seminal damental and more ethnographically authentic than earlier, intellectualist perspectives implied. Extending article (1955) on the Gahuku-Gama sees the concept of person as ''modernist,'' implying an individuated sub-to the nonhuman domain the perspective of socially biased cognition (a perspective usually restricted to the ject, and thus rejects it.
Bird-David herself seems to be locked into a dualistic world of conspecifics), she is able to rethink animism as a ''conversation'' with the environment-as a kind perspective, for we have not only a dichotomy between individual and dividual but also one between thing and of phatic communion in the Malinowskian sense. Animism, then, is just one more manifestation of a basic relation. The notion that ''thing'' is a ''modernist'' concept is also rather misleading, and setting up a dichot-human capacity, here extended to the totality of human experience. omy between ''thing'' and ''relation'' as if they were op-made clear how anthropologists could use the notion of reason that they are evaluated by distinct criteria. Science is a way of publicly presenting and evaluating evia relational epistemology to generate new or better knowledge.
dence and contains within its practice a self-correcting mechanism that addresses the critiques leveled at it by According to Bird-David, the Nayaka both do and do not distinguish the body from the spirit, the subjective postmodernists like Bird-David. The spectacular successes of scientific anthropology in expanding our from the objective, environment from behavior, the physical from the psychical, ritual from practice, and knowledge of the human condition, of ''making one's awareness of one's environment and one's self finer, humans from the physical world as well as animals, but these distinctions and other modernist assumptions broader, deeper, [and] richer,'' since the days of Tylor should be acknowledged before being replaced by the have been unthinkingly imposed on them by purveyors of science. Somehow the Nayaka do not dichotomize relativistic, antiobjectivist approach suggested in this article. like modernists but instead view apparent opposites as nested within each other, part of an overall ''we-ness'' that at the same time retains internal differentiation. What can this mean? If, as stated throughout the article, the Nayaka concept of devaru serves primarily to con-Reply vey information about the social and natural worlds, Bird-David should be able to specify what information is being conveyed. The implication is that belief in de-nuri t bi rd-dav id Haifa, Israel. 27 vi 98 varu underscores human beings' meaningful interaction with objects, animals, and other humans. I do not see how this analysis represents an advance over scientific Critical or supportive, the commentators have taken a close interest in this paper's thesis, and I appreciate anthropology.
The four stories discussed by Bird-David present pre-their reciprocity for the work I put into writing it. I shall first address critiques and misunderstandings and then cious little ethnographic evidence for the interpretations of Nayaka personhood, and the analysis demon-the suggestions offered by commentators for pursuing the argument further. strates no clear improvement over the work of Lé viStrauss and Durkheim. In addition, she speaks for the ''Science'' is needlessly defended by Sandstrom. The spectacular achievements of science are not underNayaka as if they were of one mind on this complex issue. Does no one among them contest the accepted mined at all. A graduate in economics and mathematics, I have myself worked with ''hard'' data in the objecview? That Nayaka conceptions of the person are different from Western conceptions poses no threat to scien-tivist tradition and continue to do so whenever it is possible and advantageous. Yet, powerful as it is, the tific anthropology. In fact, the differences are to be expected. Furthermore, scientific anthropology need not scientific way is neither good for studying everything nor the only way of studying everything. This-no be blind to such other perspectives. To identify unconscious assumptions that obstruct analysis is to practice more, no less-is the broadest frame within which the argument can be situated. The paper does not ''reject good science and does not justify the call for its equation with alternative ways of knowing. What Bird-Da-[science's] uniqueness as a way of knowing'' but on the contrary stresses its being unique among other ways, vid demonstrates in discussing earlier approaches to animism is the continuous subversion of orthodoxy that which makes it more-not less-intriguing for study (comparative, sociological, and historical) and precious is a primary strength of the scientific approach to the problem of knowledge. Animism is essentially a reli-as a study tool. Presenting Nayaka animistic practices as a way of knowing is not to ''blur the difference begious perspective, and the attempt here to blur the difference between religious and scientific knowledge is tween religious and scientific knowledge'' but rather to rescue these practices from our pigeon-hole ''religion,'' not only shortsighted but dangerous. Is Bird-David willing to admit creationist assertions (or other faith-based in which they were formerly placed.
The analytic use of dualisms and dichotomies is beliefs) on an equal footing with scientific knowledge?
Few contemporary anthropologists would deny that forcefully defended by Viveiros de Castro. I argue that in animistic perceptions of the environment opposidiffering cultural systems produce equally authentic ways of being human and many different ways of know-tions are of secondary importance. Therefore, in order to interpret, to try to get closer to, and to make sense ing. This is a fundamental insight deriving from scientific anthropology early in this century. The Nayaka, for of their perspectives, the language of dualisms and dichotomies is an obstacle. In no way does this imply example, appear to have a complex epistemology based on interaction and transaction. However, it would be ''dislike for dualisms and dichotomies'' in general. Indeed, to view this culture within a broader frame and foolish to deny the power of science to produce intersubjective knowledge of high validity and reliability by try to compare it with other cultures-which is equally part of the anthropologist's work-I myself use dichotoplacing it on an equal footing with all other approaches to the problem of knowledge. Etic formulations do not mies, including the one between ''a dichotomous modernist epistemology and a non-dichotomous relational invalidate emic systems of knowledge for the simple
